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Abstract
We study the problem of selling n items to a single buyer with an additive valuation function. We
consider the valuation of the items to be correlated, i.e., desirabilities of the buyer for the items are not
drawn independently. Ideally, the goal is to design a mechanism to maximize the revenue. However, it
has been shown that a revenue optimal mechanism might be very complicated and as a result inapplicable
to real-world auctions. Therefore, our focus is on designing a simple mechanism that achieves a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue. Babaioff et al. [3] propose a simple mechanism that achieves a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue for independent setting with a single additive buyer. However, they leave
the following problem as an open question: “Is there a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for
a single additive buyer whose value for n items is sampled from a common base-value distribution?”
Babaioff et al. show a constant approximation factor of the optimal revenue can be achieved by either
selling the items separately or as a whole bundle in the independent setting. We show a similar result
for the correlated setting when the desirabilities of the buyer are drawn from a common base-value
distribution. It is worth mentioning that the core decomposition lemma which is mainly the heart of the
proofs for efficiency of the mechanisms does not hold for correlated settings. Therefore we propose a
modified version of this lemma which is applicable to the correlated settings as well. Although we apply
this technique to show the proposed mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
in a very weak correlation, this method alone can not directly show the efficiency of the mechanism in
stronger correlations. Therefore, via a combinatorial approach we reduce the problem to an auction with
a weak correlation to which the core decomposition technique is applicable. In addition, we introduce
a generalized model of correlation for items and show the proposed mechanism achieves an O(log k)
approximation factor of the optimal revenue in that setting.
∗Supported in part by NSF CAREER award 1053605, NSF grant CCF-1161626, ONR YIP award N000141110662, and a
DARPA/AFOSR grant FA9550-12-1-0423.
1 Introduction
Suppose an auctioneer wants to sell n items to a single buyer. The buyer’s valuation for a particular item
comes from a known distribution, and the his values are assumed to be additive (i.e., value of a set of items
for the buyer is equal to the summation of the values of the items in the set). The buyer is considered to be
strategic, that is, he is trying to maximize v(S) − p(S), where S is the set of purchased items, v(S) is the
value of these items to the buyer and p(S) is the price of the set. Knowing that the valuation of the buyer
for item j is drawn from a given distribution Dj , what is a revenue optimal mechanism for the auctioneer to
sell the items? Myerson [19] solves the problem for a very simple case where we only have a single item
and a single buyer. He shows that in this special case the optimal mechanism is to set a fixed reserved price
for the item. Despite the simplicity of the revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item, this problem
becomes quite complicated when it comes to selling two items even when we have only one buyer. Hart
and Reny [15] show an optimal mechanism for selling two independent items is much more subtle and may
involve randomization.
Though there are several attempts to characterize the properties of a revenue optimal mechanism of an
auction, most approaches seem to be too complex and as a result impractical to real-world auctions [1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 10, 13, 16]. Therefore, a new line of investigation is to design simple mechanisms that are
approximately optimal. In a recent work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg [3], it is shown that
we can achieve a constant factor approximation of the optimal revenue by selling items either separately or
as a whole bundle in the independent setting. However, they leave the following important problem as an
open question:
• “Open Problem 3. Is there a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for a single additive buyer
whose value for n items is sampled from a common base-value distribution? What about other models
of limited correlation?”
Hart and Nisan [14] show there are instances with correlated valuations in which neither selling items sepa-
rately nor as a whole bundle can achieve any approximation of the optimal revenue. This holds, even when
we have only two times. Therefore, it is essential to consider limited models of correlation for this problem.
As an example, Babaioff et al. propose to study common base-value distributions. This model has also been
considered by Chawla, Malec, and Sivan [11] to study optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items in a
unit-demand setting.
In this work we study the problem for the case of correlated valuation functions and answer the above open
question. In addition we also introduce a generalized model of correlation between items. Suppose we
have a set of items and want to sell them to a single buyer. The buyer has a set of features in his mind and
considers a value for each feature which is randomly drawn from a known distribution. Furthermore, the
buyer formulates his desirability for each item as a linear combination of the values of the features. More
precisely, the buyer has l distributions F1, F2, . . . , Fl and an l × n matrix M (which are known in advance)
such that the value of feature i, denoted by fi, is drawn from Fi and the value of item j is calculated by
Vf ·Mj where Vf = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fl〉 and Mj is the j-th row of matrix M .
This model captures the behavior of the auctions especially when the items have different features that are
of different value to the buyers. Note that every common base-value distribution is a special case of this
general correlation where we have n + 1 features F1, F2, . . . , Fn, B and the value of item j is determined
by vj + b where vj is drawn from Fj and b is equal for all items which is drawn from distribution B.
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2 Related Work
As mentioned earlier, the problem originates from the seminal work of Myerson [19] in 1981 which char-
acterizes a revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to a single buyer. This result was important
in the sense that it was simple and practical while promising the maximum possible revenue. In contrast to
this result, it is known that designing an optimal mechanism is much harder for the case of multiple items.
There has been some efforts to find a revenue optimal mechanism for selling two heterogeneous items [20]
but, unfortunately, so far too little is known about the problem even for this simple case.
Hardness of this problem is even more highlighted when Hart and Reny [15] observed randomization is
necessary for the case of multiple items. This reveals the fact that even if we knew how to design an optimal
mechanism for selling multiple items, it would be almost impossible to implement the optimal strategy in
a real-world auction. Therefore, so far studies are focused on finding simple and approximately optimal
mechanisms.
Speaking of simple mechanisms, it is very natural to think of selling items separately or as a whole bun-
dle. The former mechanism is denoted by SRev and the latter is referred to by BRev. Hart and Nissan
[13] show SRev mechanism achieves at least an Ω(1/ log2 n) approximation of the optimal revenue in the
independent setting and BRev mechanism yields at least an Ω(1/ log n) approximation for the case of iden-
tically independent distributions. Later on, this result was improved by the work of Li and Yao, that prove
an Ω(1/ log n) approximation factor for SRev and a constant factor approximation for BRev for identically
independent distributions [17]. These bounds are tight up to a constant factor. Moreover, it is shown BRev
can be θ(n) times worse than the revenue of an optimal mechanism in the independent setting. Therefore in
order to achieve a constant factor approximation mechanism we should think of more non-trivial strategies.
The seminal work of Babaioff et al. [3] shows despite the fact that both strategies SRev and BRev may
separately result in a bad approximation factor, max{SRev,BRev} always has a revenue at least 16 of an
optimal mechanism. They also show we can determine which of these strategies has more revenue in
polynomial time which yields a deterministic simple mechanism that can be implemented in polynomial
time. However, there has been no significant progress in the case of correlated items, as [3] leave it as an
open question.
In addition to this, they posed two more questions which became the subject of further studies. In the first
question, they ask if there exists a simple mechanism which is approximately optimal in the case of multiple
additive buyers? This question is answered by Yao [22] via proposing a reduction from k-item n-bidder
auctions to k-item auctions. They show, as a result of their reduction, a deterministic mechanism achieves
a constant fraction of the optimal revenue by any randomized mechanism. In the second question, they
ask if the same result can be proved for a mechanism with a single buyer whose valuation is k-demand?
This question is also answered by a recent work of Rubinstein and Weinberg [21] which presents a positive
result. They show the same mechanism that either sells the items separately or as a whole bundle, achieves a
constant fraction of the optimal revenue even in the sub-additive setting with independent valuations. They,
too, use the core decomposition technique as their main approach. Their work is very similar in spirit to
ours since we both show the same mechanism is approximately optimal in different settings.
Another line of research investigated optimal mechanism for selling n items to a single unit-demand buyer.
Briest et al. [6] show how complex the optimal strategies can become by proving that the gap between the
revenue of deterministic mechanisms and that of non-deterministic mechanisms can be unbounded even
when we have a constant number of items with correlated values. This highlights the fact that when it comes
to general correlations, there is not much that can be achieved by deterministic mechanisms. However,
Chawla et al. [11] study the problem with a mild correlation known as the common base-value correlation
and present positive results for deterministic mechanisms in this case.
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3 Results and Techniques
We study the mechanism design for selling n items to a single buyer with additive valuation function when
desirabilities of each buyer for items are correlated. The main result of the paper is max{SRev,BRev},
that is, the revenue we get by the better of selling items separately or as a whole bundle achieves a constant
approximation of the optimal revenue when we have only one buyer and the distribution of valuations for this
buyer is a common base-value distribution. This problem was left open in [3]. Our method for proving the
effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is consisted of two parts. In the first part, we consider a very weak
correlation between the items, which we call semi-independent correlation, and show the same mechanism
achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in this setting. To this end, we use the core decomposition
technique which has been used by several similar works [17, 3, 21]. The second part, however, is based
on a combinatorial reduction which reduces the problem to an auction with a semi-independent valuation
function.
Theorem 3.1 For an auction with one seller, one buyer, and a common base-value distribution of valuations
we have max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ 112 × Rev(D).
Furthermore, we consider a natural model of correlation in which the buyer has a number of features and
scores each item based on these features. The valuation of each feature for the buyer is realized from a given
distributions which is known in advance. The value of each item to the buyer is then determined by a linear
formula in terms of the values of the features. This can also be seen as a generalization of the common
base-value correlation since a common base-value correlation can be though of as a linear correlation with
n+1 features. We show that if all of the features have the same distribution then max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}
is at least a 1
O(log k) fraction of Rev(D) where k is the maximum number of features that determine the value
of each item.
Theorem 3.2 In an auction with one seller, one buyer, and a linear correlation with i.i.d distribution of
valuations for the features max{SRev,BRev} ≥ O( Revlog k ) where the value of each item depends on at most
k features.
Our approach is as follows: First we study the problem in a setting which we call semi-independent. In this
setting, the valuation of the items are realized independently, but each item can have many copies with the
same value. More precisely, each pair of items are either similar or different. In the former case, they have
the same value for the buyer in each realization whereas in the latter case they have independent valuations.
Inspired by [3], we show max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ Rev(D)6 for every semi-independent distribution
D. To do so, we first modify the core decomposition lemma to make it applicable to the correlated settings.
Next, we apply this lemma to the problem and prove max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} achieves a constant fraction
of the optimal revenue.
Given max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} is optimal up to a constant factor in the semi-independent setting, we
analyze the behavior of max{SRev,BRev} in each of the settings by creating another auction in which
each item of the original auction is split into several items and the distributions are semi-independent. We
show that the maximum achievable revenue in the secondary auction is no less than the optimal revenue of
the original auction and also selling all items together has the same revenue in both auctions. Finally, we
bound the revenue of SRev in the original auction by a fraction of the revenue that SRev achieves in the new
auction and by putting all inequalities together we prove an approximation factor for max{SRev,BRev}. In
contrast to the prior methods for analyzing the efficiency of mechanism, our approach in this part is purely
combinatorial.
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Although the main contribution of the paper is analyzing max{SRev,BRev} in common base-value and
linear correlations, we show the following as auxiliary lemmas which might be of independent interest.
• One could consider a variation of independent setting, wherein each item has a number of copies
and the value of all copies of an item to the buyer is always the same. We show in this setting
max{SRev,BRev} is still a constant fraction of Rev.
• A natural generalization of i.i.d settings, is a setting in which the distributions of valuations are not
exactly the same, but are the same up to scaling. We show, in the independent setting with such
valuation functions BRev is at least an O( 1log n) fraction of Rev.
4 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we study the optimal mechanisms for selling n items to a risk-neutral, quasi-linear
buyer. The items are considered to be indivisible and not necessarily identical i.e. the buyer can have
different distributions of desirabilities for different items. In our setting, distributions are denoted by D =
〈D1,D2, . . . ,Dn〉 where Dj is the distribution for item j. Moreover, the buyer has a valuation vector
V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 which is randomly drawn from D specifying the values he has for the items. Note
that, values may be correlated.
Once a mechanism is set for selling items, the buyer purchases a set SV of the items that maximizes v(SV )−
p(SV ), where v(SV ) is the desirability of SV for the buyer and p(SV ) is the price that he pays. The revenue
achieved by a mechanism is equal to
∑
E
[
p(SV )
]
where V is randomly drawn from D. The following
terminology is used in [3] in order to compare the performance of different mechanisms. In this paper we
use similar notations.
• Rev(D): Maximum possible revenue that can be achieved by any truthful mechanism.
• SRev(D): The revenue that we get when selling items separately using Myerson’s optimal mechanism
for selling each item.
• BRev(D): The revenue that we get when selling all items as a whole bundle using Myerson’s optimal
mechanism.
We refer to the expected value and variance of a one-dimensional distribution D by Val(D) and Var(D)
respectively. We say an n-dimensional distribution D of the desirabilities of a buyer is independent over the
items if for every a 6= b, va and vb are independent variables when V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 is drawn from D.
Furthermore, we define the semi-independent distributions as follows.
Definition 4.1 Let D be a distribution of valuations of a buyer over a set of items. We say D is semi-
independent iff the valuations of every two different items are either always equal or completely independent.
Moreover, we say two items a and b are similar in a semi-independent distribution D if for every V ∼ D we
have va = vb.
Moreover, we define the common base-value distributions as follows.
Definition 4.2 We say a distribution D is common base-value, if there exist independent distributions
F1, F2, . . . , Fn, B such that for V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 ∼ D and every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, vj = fj + b where
fj comes from distribution Fj and b is drawn from B which is equal for all items.
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A natural generalization of common base-value distributions are distributions in which the valuation of each
item is determined by a linear combination of k independent variables which are the same for all items.
More precisely, we define the linear distributions as follows.
Definition 4.3 Let D be a distribution of valuations of a buyer for n items. We say D is a linear dis-
tribution if there exist independent desirability distributions F1, F2, . . . , Fk and a k × n matrix M with
non-negative rational values such that V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉 ∼ D, can be written as W × M where
W = 〈w1, w2, . . . , wk〉 is a vector such that wi is drawn from Fi.
5 The Core Decomposition Technique
Most of the results in this area are mainly achieved by the core decomposition technique which was first
introduced in [17]. Using this technique we can bound the revenue of an optimal mechanism without taking
into account the complexities of the revenue optimal mechanism. The underlying idea is to split distributions
into two parts: the core and the tail. If for each realization of the values we were to know in advance for
which items the valuations in the core part will be and for which items the valuations in the tail part will
be, we would achieve at least the optimal revenue achievable without such information. This gives us an
intuition which we can bound the optimal revenue by the total sum of the revenues of 2n auctions where
in each auction we know which valuation is in which part. The tricky part then would be to separate the
items whose valuations are in the core part from the items whose valuations are in the tail and sum them up
separately. We use the same notation which was used in [3] for formalizing our arguments as follows.
• Di: The distribution of desirabilities of the buyer for item i.
• DA: (A is a subset of items): The distribution of desirabilities of the buyer for items in A.
• ri: The revenue that we get by selling item i using Myerson’s optimal mechanism.
• r: The revenue we get by selling all of the items separately using Myerson’s optimal mechanism
which is equal to
∑
ri.
• ti: A real number separating the core from the tail for the distribution of item i. we say a valuation vi
for item i is in the core if 0 ≤ vi ≤ riti and is in the tail otherwise.
• pi: A real number equal to the probability that vi > riti when vi is drawn from Di.
• pA: (A is a subset of items): A real number equal to the probability that ∀i /∈ A, vi ≤ riti and
∀i ∈ A, vi > riti.
• DCi : A distribution of valuations of the i-th item that is equal to Di conditioned on vi ≤ riti.
• DTi : A distribution of valuations of the i-th item for the buyer that is equal to Di conditioned on
vi > riti.
• DCA : (A is a subset of items): A distribution of valuations of the items in [N ]−A for the buyer that is
equal to D[N ]−A conditioned on ∀i /∈ A, vi ≤ riti.
• DTA: (A is a subset of items): A distribution of valuations of the items in A for the buyer that is equal
to DA conditioned on ∀i ∈ A, vi > riti.
• DA: A distribution of valuations for all items which is equal to D conditioned on both ∀i /∈ A, vi ≤
riti and ∀i ∈ A, vi > riti.
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In Lemma 5.2 we provide an upper bound for pi. Next we bound Rev(DCi ) and Rev(D) in Lemmas 5.3 and
5.4 and finally in Lemma 5.6 which is known as Core Decomposition Lemma we prove an upper bound for
Rev(D). All these lemmas are proved in [3] for the case of independent setting.
Lemma 5.1 For every A ⊂ [N ], if the valuation of items in A are independent of items in [N ]−A then we
have Rev(D) ≤ Rev(DA) + Val(D[N ]−A).
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that Rev(D) > Rev(DA) + Val(D[N ]−A), we show one can
sell items of A to obtain an expected revenue more than Rev(DA) which contradicts with maximality of
Rev(DA). To this end, we add items of [N ]−A (which are of no value to the buyer) and do the following:
• We draw a valuation for items in [N ]−A based on D.
• We sell all items with the optimal mechanism for selling items of D.
• Finally, the buyer can return each item that has bought from the set [N ] − A and get refunded by
the auctioneer a value equal to what has been drawn for that item. Note that, since the buyer has no
desirability for these items, it is in his best interest to return them.
Note that, we fake the desirabilities of the buyer for items in [N ] − A with the money that the auctioneer
returns in the last step. Therefore, the behavior of the buyer is as if he had a value for those items as well.
Since the money that the auctioneer returns to the buyer is at most Val([N ]−A) (in expectation), and we he
achieves Rev(D) (in expectation) at first, the expected revenue that we obtain is at least Rev(D)−Val([N ]−
A) which is greater than Rev(DA) and contradicts with the maximality of Rev(DA).
Lemma 5.2 pi ≤ 1ti .
Proof: Suppose we run a second price auction with reserve price tiri. Since the revenue achieved by this
auction is equal to pitiri and is at most Rev(Di) = ri we have pi ≤ 1ti .
Lemma 5.3 Rev(DCi ) ≤ ri.
Proof: This lemma follows from the fact that DCi is stochastically dominated by Di. Therefore Rev(Di) ≥
Rev(DCi ) and thus Rev(DCi ) ≤ ri.
Lemma 5.4 Rev(DTi ) ≤ ri/pi.
Proof: By definition, the probability that a random variable drawn from Di lies in the tail is equal to pi,
therefore Rev(DTi ) cannot be more than piri, since otherwise Rev(Di) would be more than ri which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 5.5 Rev(D) ≤
∑
A pARev(D
A).
Proof: Suppose the seller has a magical oracle that after the realization of desirabilities, it informs him for
which items the valuation of the buyer lies in the tail and for which items it lies in the core. Let A be the
set of items whose values lie in the tail. By definition, the maximum possible revenue (in expectation) that
the seller can achieve in this case is Rev(DA) and this happens with probability pA, therefore having the
magical oracle, the maximum expected revenue of the seller is
∑
A pARev(D
A). Since this oracle gives the
seller some additional information, the optimal revenue that the seller can guarantee in this case is at least
as much as Rev(D) and hence
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pARev(D
A).
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For independent setting we can apply Lemma 5.1 to Lemma 5.5 and finally with application of some alge-
braic inequalities come up with the following inequality
Rev(D) ≤ Val(DC∅ ) +
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A).
Unfortunately this does not hold for correlated settings since in Lemma 5.1 we assume valuation of items of
A are independent of the items of [N ] − A. Therefore, we need to slightly modify this lemma such that it
becomes applicable to the correlated settings as well. Thus, we add the following restriction to the valuation
of items: For each subset A such that pA is non-zero, the valuation of items in A are independent of items
of [N ]−A.
Lemma 5.6 If for every A with pA > 0 the values of items in A are drawn independent of the items in
[N ]−A we have Rev(D) ≤ Val(DC
∅
) +
∑
A pARev(D
T
A).
Proof: According to Lemma 5.5 we have
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pARev(D
A). (5.1)
Since for every A such that pA > 0 we know the values of items in A are drawn independent of items in
[N ]−A, we can apply Lemma 5.1 to Inequality (5.1) and come up with the following inequality.
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pA[Val(D
C
A) + Rev(D
T
A)].
Note that, DC∅ is an upper bound for Val(D
C
A) for all A. Therefore
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pA[Val(D
C
∅ ) + Rev(D
T
A)].
We rewrite the inequality to separate Val(DC∅ ) from Rev(D
T
A).
Rev(D) ≤
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) +
∑
A
pAVal(D
C
∅ ).
Since
∑
pA = 1
Rev(D) ≤ Val(DC∅ ) +
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A).
6 Semi-Independent distributions
In this section we show the better of selling items separately and as a whole bundle is approximately optimal
for the semi-independent correlations. To do so, we first show k · SRev(D) ≥ Rev(D) where we have n
items divided into k types such that items of each type are similar. Next we leverage this lemma in order
to prove max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} achieves a constant-factor approximation of the revenue of an optimal
mechanism. We start by stating the following lemma which is proved in [18].
Lemma 6.1 In an auction with one seller, one buyer, and multiple similar items we have Rev(D) =
SRev(D).
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Proof: [Proof of Lemma 6.1] Suppose we have n similar items with valuation function D for the buyer. By
definition Rev(D) ≥ SRev(D) since Rev(D) is the maximal possible revenue that we can achieve. There-
fore we need to show Rev(D) cannot be more than SRev(D). Since all the items are similar, SRev(D) =
nRev(Di) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In the rest we show Rev(D) cannot be more than n times of Rev(Di). We
design the following mechanism for selling just one of the items:
• Pick an integer number g between 1 and n uniformly at random and keep it private.
• Use the optimal mechanism for selling n similar items, except that the prices are divided over n.
• At the end, give the item to the buyer that has bought item number g (if any), and take back all other
sold items.
Note that, in the buyer’s perspective both the prices and the expectation of the number of items they buy are
divided by n, therefore they’ll have the same behavior as before. Since prices are divided by n the revenue
we get by the above mechanism is exactly Rev(D)
n
which implies Rev(D) ≤ nRev(Di) and completes the
proof.
We also need Lemma 6.2 proved in [13] and [3] which bounds the revenue when we have a sub-domain S
two independent value distributions D and D′ over disjoint sets of items. Moreover we use Lemma 6.3 as
an auxiliary lemma in the proof of Lemma 6.4.
Lemma 6.2 (“Marginal Mechanism on Sub-Domain [13, 3]”) LetD and D′ be two independent distribu-
tions over disjoint sets of items. Let S be a set of values of D and D′ and s be the probability that a sample
of D and D′ lies in S, i.e. s = Pr[(v, v′) ∼ D ×D′ ∈ S]. sRev(D ×D′|(v, v′) ∈ S) ≤ sVal(D|(v, v′) ∈
S) + Rev(D′).
Lemma 6.3 In a single-seller mechanism with m buyers and n items with a semi-independent correlation
between the items in which there are at most k non-similar items we have Rev(D) ≤ mk · SRev(D).
Proof: First we prove the case m = 1. The proof is by induction on k. For k = 1, all items are identical and
by Lemma 6.1 Rev(D) = SRev(D). Now we prove the case in which we have k non-similar types assuming
the theorem holds for k − 1. Consider a partition of D into two parts S1 and S2 where in S1, v1c1 ≥ civi
for each i and in S2 there is at least one type i such that civi > c1v1. Let D1 and D2 denote the valuations
conditioned on S1 and S2, respectively, and let p1 and p2 denote the probability that the valuations lie in D1
and D2. Since we do not lose revenue due to having extra information about the domain
Rev(D) ≤ p1Rev(D
1) + p2Rev(D
2). (6.1)
Thus we need to bound p1Rev(D1) and p2Rev(D2). Let D−i denote the distribution of valuations exclud-
ing the items of type i. Using Lemma 6.2, p1Rev(D1) ≤ p1Val(D1−1) + Rev(D1) and p2Rev(D2) ≤
p2Val(D
2
1) + Rev(D−1). Hence by Inequality (6.1),
Rev(D) ≤ p1Val(D
1
−1) + Rev(D1) + p2Val(D
2
1) + Rev(D−1). (6.2)
Now the goal is to bound four terms in Inequality (6.2). For the first term consider the following truthful
mechanism. Assume we only want to sell the items of type one. We take a sample v ∼ D and then sell all
c1 items of type one in a bundle with price max2≤i≤k{civi}. With probability p1, c1v1 ≥ max2≤i≤k{civi}
and hence the bundle would be sold. Thus with probability p1, valuations lie in D1 which means for each i
v1c1 ≥ civi and the revenue we get is c1v1, therefore
p1Val(D
1
−1) ≤ kRev(D1). (6.3)
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For the third term we provide another truthful mechanism which can sell all items except the items of type
one. Take a sample v ∼ D, put all items of the same type in the same bundles, except the items of type one.
Hence we have k − 1 bundles. Price all bundles equal to c1v1. With probability p2 at least one bundle has a
valuation greater than c1v1 and as a result would be sold and the revenue is more than Val(D21). Moreover
by Lemma 6.1 in each bundle the maximum revenue is achieved by selling the items separately, thus
p2Val(D
2
1) ≤ SRev(D−1). (6.4)
Moreover by induction hypothesis,
Rev(D−1) ≤ kSRev(D−1)). (6.5)
Summing up inequalities (6.3), (6.4), and (6.5), p1Val(D1−1) + Rev(D1) + p2Val(D21) + Rev(D−1) ≤
kSRev(D1) + Rev(D1) + SRev(D−1) + kSRev(D−1). Therefore, Rev(D) ≤ (k+ 1)SRev(D), as desired.
Now we prove that for any m ≥ 1, Rev(D) ≤ mkSRev(D). Note that any mechanism for m buyers
provides m single buyer mechanisms and Rev(D) =
∑m
i=1 Revi(D), where Revi(D) is the revenue for i-th
buyer. Thus maxi Revi(D) ≥ 1mRev(D) and as a result Rev(D) ≤ mkSRev(D).
Next, we show max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ 16 · Rev(D). The proof is very similar in spirit to the proof
of Babaioff et al. for showing max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} achieves a constant approximation factor of the
revenue optimal mechanism in independent setting [3]. In this proof, we first apply the core decomposition
lemma with ti = r/(rini) and break down the problem into two sub-problems. In the first sub-problem we
show
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 2SRev(D) and in the second sub-problem we prove 4max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥
Val(DC
∅
). Having these two bounds together, we apply the core decomposition lemma to imply max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥
1
6 · Rev(D).
Lemma 6.4 Let D be a semi-independent distribution of valuations for n items in single buyer setting. In
this problem we have max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ 16 · Rev(D).
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 6.4] We use the core decomposition technique to prove this lemma. Let ni be the
number of items that are similar to item i. We set ti = r/(rini) and then apply the Core Decomposition
Lemma to prove a lower bound for max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}. According to this lemma we have
Rev(D) ≤
[∑
A
pARev(D
T
A)
]
+
[
Val(DC∅ )
]
.
To prove the theorem, we first show
∑
A pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 2SRev(D) and next prove Val(DC∅ ) ≤ 4 ·
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} which together imply
Rev(D) ≤
[∑
A
pARev(D
T
A)
]
+
[
Val(DC∅ )
]
≤ 2SRev(D) + 4max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}
≤ (2 + 4)max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≤ 6max{SRev(D),BRev(D)}.
Proposition 6.1 If we set ti = r/(rini) the following inequality holds in the single buyer setting.
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤ 2SRev(D) (6.6)
where D is a semi-independent valuation function for n items.
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Proof: According to Lemma 6.4 we have
Rev(DTA) ≤ dASRev(D
T
A) ≤ dA
(∑
i∈A
Rev(DTi )
)
≤ dA
(∑
i∈A
ri
pi
)
. (6.7)
Therefore, the following inequality holds.
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
∑
A
pAdA
(∑
i∈A
ri
pi
)
. (6.8)
where dA is the number of non-similar items in A. By rewriting Equation (6.8) we get
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
n∑
i=1
ri
pi
(∑
A∋i
pAdA
)
=
n∑
i=1
ri
n∑
j=1
j
1
pi
( ∑
A∋i∧dA=j
pA
)
. (6.9)
Note that,
∑n
j=1 j
1
pi
∑
A∋i∧dA=j
pA is the expected number of different items in the tail, conditioned on
item i being in the tail. All of similar items lie in the tail together, and this probability is at most 1
tj
=
njrj
r
.
Therefore, apart from i, the expected number of different sets of similar items in the tail is at most 1 and
hence
∑n
j=1 j
1
pi
∑
A∋i∧dA=j
pA < 2. Therefore,
∑
A
pARev(D
T
A) ≤
n∑
i=1
ri
n∑
j=1
j
1
pi
( ∑
A∋i∧dA=j
pA
)
≤
n∑
i=1
2ri = 2SRev(D).
Next, we show that max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} is at least Val(D
C
∅
)
4 which completes the proof. In the proof
of this proposition, we use the following Lemma which has been proved by Li and Yao in [17].
Lemma 6.5 Let F be a one-dimensional distribution with optimal revenue at most c supported on [0, tc].
Then Var(F ) ≤ (2t− 1)c2.
Proposition 6.2 For a single buyer in semi-independent setting we have
4max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ Val(DC∅ ) (6.10)
where ti = r/(rini).
Proof: Since SRev(D) = r, the proof is trivial when Val(DC∅ ) ≤ 4r. Therefore, from now on we assume
Val(DC
∅
) > 4r. We show that Var(DC
∅
) ≤ 2r2 and use this fact in order to show BRev(D) is a constant
approximation of Rev(DC
∅
). To this end, we formulate the variance of DC
∅
as follows:
Var(DC∅ ) = Var(D
C
1 +D
C
2 + . . .+D
C
N ) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Covar(DCi ,D
C
j ) (6.11)
Note that Covar(DCi ,DCj ) = Var(DCi ) if items i and j are equal and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
Var(DC∅ ) =
n∑
i=1
Var(DCi )× ni (6.12)
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Recall that Lemma 6.5 states that Var(DCi ) ≤ 2rri/ni, and thus
Var(DC∅ ) ≤
n∑
i=1
Var(DCi )× ni ≤
n∑
i=1
2rri ≤ 2r
2 (6.13)
Since Val(DC∅ ) ≥ 4r and Var(D
C
∅ ) ≤ 2r
2
, we can apply the Chebyshev’s Inequality to show
Pr
[∑
vi ≤
2
5
Val(DC∅ )
]
≤
Var(D)
(1− 25)
2Val(DC
∅
)2
≤
2r2
(1− 25 )
216r2
≤
25
72
(6.14)
This implies that the following pricing algorithm yields a revenue at least of 47·272·5Val(D
C
∅ ): put a price equal
to 25Val(D
C
∅
) on the whole set of items as a bundle. Since, BRev(D) is the best pricing mechanism for
selling all items as a bundle we have
BRev(D) ≥
47 · 2
72 · 5
Val(DC∅ ) ≥
Val(DC∅ )
4
7 Common Base-Value Distributions
In this section we study the same problem with a common base-value distribution. Recall that in such
distributions desirabilities of the buyer are of the form vj = fj + bi where fj is drawn from a known
distribution Fj and bi is the same for all items and is drawn from a known distribution B. Again, we show
max{SRev,BRev} achieves a constant factor approximation of Rev when we have only one buyer. Note
that, this result answers an open question raised by Babaioff et al. in [3].
Theorem 7.1 For an auction with one seller, one buyer, and a common base-value distribution of valuations
we have max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ 112 × Rev(D).
Proof: Let I be an instance of the auction. We create an instance Cor(I) of an auction with 2n items such
that the distribution of valuations is a semi-independent distribution D′ where D′i = Fi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
D′i = B for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. Moreover, the valuations of the items n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n are always equal
and all other valuations are independent. Thus, by the definition, D′ is a semi-independent distribution of
valuations and by Lemma 6.4 we have
max{SRev(D′),BRev(D′)} ≥
1
6
× Rev(D′). (7.1)
Since every mechanism for selling the items of D can be mapped to a mechanism for selling the items of D′
where items i and n+ i are considered as a single package containing both items, we have
Rev(D) ≤ Rev(D′). (7.2)
Moreover, since in the bundle mechanism we sell all of the items as a whole bundle, the revenue achieved
by bundle mechanism is the same in both auctions. Hence,
BRev(D) = BRev(D′). (7.3)
Note that, we can consider SRev(D) as a mechanism for selling items of Cor(I) such that items are packed
into partitions of size 2 (item i is packed with item n + i) and each partition is priced with Myerson’s
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optimal mechanism. Since for every two independent distributions Fi, Fi+n we have SRev(Fi × Fn+i) ≤
2 · BRev(Fi × Fn+i) we can imply
SRev(D) =
n∑
i=1
BRev(Fi × Fn+i) ≥
n∑
i=1
SRev(Fi × Fi+n)
2
=
SRev(D′)
2
. (7.4)
According to Inequalities (7.1),(7.2), and (7.3) we have
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥ max{SRev(D′)/2,BRev(D′)} ≥
max{SRev(D′),BRev(D′)}/2 ≥ Rev(D′)/12 ≥ Rev(D)/12.
8 Linear Correlations
A natural generalization of common base-value distributions is an extended correlation such that the val-
uation of each item for a buyer is a linear combination of his desirabilities for some features where the
distribution of desirabilities for the features are independent and known in advance. More precisely, let
F1, F2, . . . , Fl be l independent distributions of desirabilities of features for the buyer and once each value fj
is drawn from Fj , desirability of the buyer for j-th item is determined by Vf ·Mj where Vf = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fl〉
and M is an n× l matrix containing non-negative values.
Note that, a semi-independent distribution of valuations is a special case of linear correlation where we have
n + 1 features F1, F2, . . . , Fn+1 and M is a matrix such that Ma,b = 1 if either a = b or b = n + 1 and
Ma,b = 0 otherwise. In this case, Fn+1 is the base value which is shared between all items and each of the
other distributions is dedicated to a single item.
In this section we show the better of selling items separately or as a whole bundle achieves anO(log k) factor
approximation of Rev(D) when the distribution of valuations for all features are the same and the value of
each item is determined by the value of at most k features. To this end, we first consider an independent
setting where the distribution of items are the same up to scaling and prove BRev is at least O(SRevlogn ). Next,
we leverage this lemma to show the main result of this section.
8.1 Independent Setting
In this part, we consider distributions which are similar to independent identical distributions, but their
values are scaled by a constant factor. In particular, D is a scaled distribution of F if and only if for every
X, Pru∼D[u = X] = Pru∼F [u = αX]. We provide an upper bound for the ratio of the separate pricing
revenue to the bundle pricing revenue for a set of items with independent scaled distributions. The following
proposition shows this ratio is maximized when the value for each item i is either 0 or a constant number.
Proposition 8.1 For every distribution D = D1 ×D2 × . . . ×Dn, where Di’s are independent, there is a
D′ = D′1 ×D
′
2 × . . . ×D
′
n, such that
SRev(D′)
BRev(D′) ≥
SRev(D)
BRev(D) and for each D′i there is an Xi and pi such that
Pru∼D′i [u = Xi] = pi and Pru∼D′i [u = 0] = 1− pi.
Proof: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n let ui denote the Myerson price for Di. Let pi = Pru∼Di [u ≥ ui]. Thus the
revenue for selling i separately is piui. Now Let D′i be a distribution which is 0 with probability 1− pi and
ui with probability pi. Thus SRev(D′) = uipi = SRev(D). However since for each i, Di dominates D′i,
BRev(D′) ≤ BRev(D). Therefore, SRev(D
′)
BRev(D′) ≥
SRev(D)
BRev(D) .
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Thus from now on, we assume each item i has value ui = αiu with probability p and 0 with probability
1− p. Without loss of generality we can assume u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ un. In order to prove our bound we need
to use the following theorem and Lemma 8.1.
Theorem 8.1 (See Yao[22]) There exists a constant c0 such that for every integer n ≥ 2 and every D =
D1 ×D2 × . . . ×Dn, where Di = F are independent and identical distributions, we have c0BRev(D) ≥
Rev(D).
Lemma 8.1 There exists a constant c such that for every integer 1 ≤ j ≤ n and every D = D1 × D2 ×
. . .×Dn, where Di = αiF are independent scaled distributions, we have cBRev(D) ≥ jpuj .
Proof: To show there exists a constant c such that cBRev(D) ≥ jpuj , first we consider another set of
items with distribution D′ such that BRev(D) ≥ BRev(D′). Then we show there is a constant c such that
cBRev(D′) ≥ jpuj .
Let D′ = Djj i.e., a set of j items with independent and identical distribution Dj . Note that for each i < j,
ui ≥ uj . Thus if i ≤ j, Di dominates Dj . Moreover we are ignoring the other n − j items. This implies
BRev(D) ≥ BRev(D′).
Now by Theorem 8.1, there is a constant c0 such that
c0BRev(D
′) ≥ Rev(D′). (8.1)
On the other hand, by selling the items separately the revenue for each item is puj . Hence
SRev(D′) = jpuj . (8.2)
Thus we can conclude,
c0BRev(D) ≥ c0BRev(D
′) By Inequality (8.1)
≥ Rev(D′)
≥ SRev(D′) By Equation (8.2)
= jpuj .
Lemma 8.2 There exists a constant c′ such that for every D = D1 ×D2 × . . .×Dn, where Di = αiF are
independent scaled distributions, we have c′BRev(D) ≥ 1log(n)SRev(D).
Proof: First we prove there exists an integer 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that jpuj ≥ 11+ln(n)SRev(D). Then using
Lemma 8.1 we obtain cBRev(D) ≥ 11+ln(n)SRev(D).
Each item i has value 0 with probability 1−p, and ui with probability p. Thus the optimal separate price for
item i is ui and the expected revenue for that is pui. Thus SRev(D) = p
∑n
i=1 ui Assume by contradiction
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, jpuj < 11+ln(n)SRev(D) =
1
1+ln(n)p
∑n
i=1 ui. Simplifying the equation and moving
j to the right hand size, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have
uj <
1
1 + ln(n)
1
j
n∑
i=1
ui. (8.3)
Summing up Inequality (8.3) for all j we have
n∑
j=1
uj <
1
1 + ln(n)
n∑
j=1
1
j
n∑
i=1
ui. (8.4)
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This implies 1 < 11+ln(n)Hn, which is a contradiction. Thus there is an integer j such that jpuj ≥
1
1+ln(n)SRev(D). Now by Lemma 8.1, there is a constant c such that cBRev(D) ≥ jpuj . Thus c
′BRev(D) ≥
1
log(n)SRev(D).
Babaioff et al. [3] show that for n independent items and a single additive buyer the maximum of SRev
and BRev is a constant fraction of the maximal revenue. Thus from Lemma 8.2 we can conclude that
c′BRev(D) ≥ 11+ln(n)Rev(D).
Corollary 8.1 There exists a constant c′ such that for every D = D1 ×D2 × . . . ×Dn, where Di = αiF
are independent scaled distributions, we have c′BRev(D) ≥ 1log(n)Rev(D).
8.2 Correlated Setting
The following theorem shows an O(log k) approximation factor for max{SRev,BRev} when considering a
linear correlation with i.i.d distributions for the features.
Theorem 8.2 Let D be a distribution of valuations for one buyer in an auction such that the correlation
between items is linear. If each row of M has at most k non-zero entries, then
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥
Rev(D)
c′′ log n
where c′′ > 0 is a constant real number.
Proof: Since we can multiply the entries of the matrix by any integer number and divide the values of
distribution by that number without violating any constraint of the setting, for simplicity, we assume all
values of M are integer numbers. Let I be an instance of our auction. We create an instance Cor(I) of an
auction a with semi-independent distribution as follows: Let ni be the total sum of numbers in i-th column
ofM . For each feature we put a set of items in Cor(I) containing ni similar elements. Moreover, we consider
every two items of different types to be independent. We refer to the distribution of items in Cor(I) with D′.
Each mechanism of auction I can be mapped to a mechanism of auction Cor(I) by just partitioning items
of Cor(I) into some packages, such that package i has Mi,a items from a-th type, and then treating each
package as a single item. Therefore we have
Rev(D) ≤ Rev(D′). (8.5)
Moreover, bundle mechanism has the same revenue in both auctions since it sells all items as a whole
package. Therefore the following equation holds.
BRev(D) = BRev(D′) (8.6)
To complete the proof we leverage Lemma 8.2 to compare SRev(D) with SRev(D′). In the following we
show
SRev(D) ≥
SRev(D′)
c′ log k
. (8.7)
for a constant number c′ > 0. Note that selling items of auction I separately, can be thought of as selling
items of Cor(I) in partitions with at most k non-similar items. To compare SRev(D) with SRev(D′), we
only need to compare the revenue achieved by selling each item of I with the revenue achieved by selling
its corresponding partition in Cor(I). To this end, we create an instance Cor(I)i of an auction for each
item i of I which is consisted of all items in Cor(I) corresponding to item i of I such that all similar items
are considered as a single item having a value equal to the sum of the values of those items. Let Li be a
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partition of such items. When selling items of I separately, our revenue is as if we sell all items of Li as a
whole bundle. Therefore this gives us a total revenue of BRev(Cor(I)i). However, when we sell items of
Cor(I) separately, the revenue we get from selling items of Li is exactly SRev(Cor(I)i). Note that, since
all of the features have the same distribution of valuation, Cor(I)i contains at most k independent items and
the distribution of valuations for all items are the same up to scaling. Therefore, according to Lemma 8.2
SRev(Li) ≤ BRev(Li)c
′ log k for a constant number c′ > 0 and hence Inequality (8.7) holds.
Next, we follow an approximation factor for max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} from Inequalities (8.7), (8.5), and
(8.6). By Inequalities (8.7) and (8.6) we have
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥
max{SRev(D′)BRev(D′)}
c′ log k
(8.8)
Moreover according to Inequality (8.5) Rev(D) ≤ Rev(D′) holds and by Lemma 6.4 we have max{SRev(D′),BRev(D′)} ≥
Rev(D′)
6 which yields
max{SRev(D),BRev(D)} ≥
Rev(D)
6c′ log k
Setting c′′ = 6c′ the proof is complete.
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